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Welfare Incentives and Interstate Migration: 
An Analysis of the Migration Decisions of Poor, Single Mothers
John Weis
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of welfare incentives in the 
decision to move for poor, single mothers.  Using micro-level data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and other sources, I develop an econometric 
model that estimates the influence of state welfare benefits on the interstate 
migration decisions of poor, single mothers, whether that be moving from states 
with low benefits or to states with high benefits.  This study builds upon previous 
literature concerning interstate migration by considering new methodological 
approaches and theoretical models.  Ultimately, the evidence suggests that while 
the welfare benefits offered at the current state of residence and those at potential 
states of residence influence the migration decisions of poor, single mothers, the 
effects are modest.
 
I. Introduction
 Under The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
replaced Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as a primary federal 
cash assistance program.  The provisions of TANF obligated states to individually 
develop their own welfare systems.  As a result, there was a rapid and substantial 
increase in the diversification of welfare policies between states relative to the 
past (Blank, 2002).  These diversified welfare rules and benefit levels potentially 
provide greater incentives for poor families to move to those states offering 
greater benefits levels in order to receive more financial aid (De Jong, Graefe, 
and St. Pierre, 2005).  Of those affected by welfare incentives, poor, single 
mothers comprise the subgroup of the population most likely to be influenced 
by greater welfare benefits given their comparatively difficult situation (Levine 
and Zimmerman, 1999).  Thus, if a welfare-induced migration phenomenon does 
exist, it is most likely present in the migration decisions of poor, single mothers. 
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As such, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the migration decisions of poor, 
single mothers by estimating to what extent they move from low welfare benefit 
states to high welfare benefit states.
  The economic significance of welfare-induced migration has been well-
documented.  Assuming the poor can afford the cost of moving, states with lax 
welfare requirements or large benefit payments could experience considerable 
influxes of populations largely comprised of poor families (Gelbach, 2004). 
Having to bear the burden of the additional poor population has concerned states 
for decades (Meyer, 2000).  In response, setting lower benefit levels or stricter 
eligibility requirements for a state can disincentivize poor families from moving 
there (Cushing, 2002).  However, multiple states attempting to accomplish 
the above can lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ wherein states compete to export 
their poverty burden by offering progressively lower welfare payment benefits 
(Brueckner, 2000).  Evidence of the efforts by states to outcompete other states 
to avoid poverty populations has been well-documented (see Figlio et al. (1998) 
and Saavedra (1998)).  The efforts by state policymakers have even led to several 
prominent Supreme Court cases (Shapiro v. Thompson [1969] and Saenz v. Roe 
[1999]) in which residency requirements for welfare payment were deemed 
unconstitutional (Gelbach, 2004).  Overall, the results of the economic policy 
and changes to welfare systems enacted by states have tangible impacts on the 
well-being of those individuals and families living in poverty.  Since the lives of 
individuals are dependent upon state-specific objectives influenced by welfare-
induced migration concerns, the economic significance of welfare-induced 
migration is clear.
 My interest in the research subject developed from two primary sources 
of personal significance.  Firstly, as will be developed later, the literature on the 
topic is largely inconclusive.  This represents an opportunity for someone to make 
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a significant contribution and have a lasting impact on the discourse surrounding 
the issue.  Additionally, because the research is uncertain, any significant research 
could have substantial policy implications for state policymakers.  Secondly, I 
have always had a general interest in welfare policy and the effects of said policy 
(in this case potentially adverse effects).  While the purpose of the paper is largely 
exploratory in nature, exposing potential shortcomings of welfare policy, it also 
serves as an attempt to promote better practices for policymakers by encouraging 
a deeper consideration of the consequences of state policies.  The hope is that 
this research paper may, in some way, generate progress in the form of more 
appropriate policy. 
 As stated earlier, this paper will investigate the degree to which poor, 
single mothers move from low welfare benefit states to high welfare benefit states. 
In the next section, a brief survey of relevant welfare migration literature will 
be provided.  Afterwards, using the theoretical frameworks provided by recent 
welfare-induced migration research, an econometric model will be developed 
to analyze the research question from an alternative perspective.  In the section 
that follows, the description of data and data collection will be presented.  In 
the penultimate section, the empirical results of the econometric model will be 
discussed.  Lastly, I will conclude with a brief summary of the study’s findings 
and implications for future research.
II. Literature Review
 In developing the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis of local public 
expenditures, Tiebout (1956) became one of the first individuals to discuss, albeit 
indirectly, the potential for welfare-induced migration.  While the focus of the 
original paper was on the role that the mobility of workers played in promoting 
an efficient allocation of public goods, underlying ideas and concepts are directly 
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applicable to research on welfare-induced migration. Specifically, the concept 
that individuals moved to states or regions which offer a bundle of goods that 
maximize their utility has served as a primary motivating factor in the decision to 
move.
 According to Moffitt (1992), early researchers in the 1970s only had 
access to aggregated data, making it impractical to identify poverty populations. 
They were forced to rely on race as a proxy variable for poverty.  Furthermore, 
they failed to account for important state-level differences, such as unemployment 
rates, in their analyses of the migration decision-making process for families. 
Therefore, research in the 1970s is generally discounted (Cushing, 2002).  
 Meanwhile, the research of the 1980s remedied shortcomings of 
previous work with the aid of microdata which gave them the ability to directly 
observe poverty populations. In this period, Gramlich and Laren (1984), Friedli 
(1986), Blank (1988), Cebula and Koch (1989), Peterson and Rom (1989), and 
Dye (1990) all conducted studies that found strong evidence for the existence of 
a welfare effect on the decision to move for poor families. Most of the work at 
this time made use of the newly available Public Use Microdata Series (PUMS) to 
examine welfare-induced migration. Compelling evidence that suggest opposing 
conclusions during the same time period is relatively scarce, if not entirely 
nonexistent.
 Of course, if there was such an overwhelming consensus today, I would 
be doing research on a different topic.  In fact, the research conducted since the 
early 1990s has witnessed a significant split in general opinion.  Hanson and 
Hartman (1994), Borjas (1998), Gelbach (2004), and Snarr (2011) all reached 
conclusions supportive of a substantial influence of welfare benefits on the 
decision to move.  Conversely, Walker (1994, 1995), Allard and Danziger (2000), 
Kennan and Walker (2010) failed to find any evidence of a welfare effect on the 
43
decision to move.  These two groups represent different extremes with most of 
the research reaching conclusions that lie somewhere in between these two sides. 
Specifically, Frey et al (1996), Enchautegui (1997), Schram, Nitz, and Krueger 
(1998), Levine and Zimmerman (1999), Meyer (2000), Kaestner, Kaushal, and 
Van Ryzin (2003), Gelbach (2004), and McKinnish (2005, 2007) have all found 
results suggesting there is welfare-induced migration but that this effect is fairly 
modest.  Unfortunately, direct comparisons are difficult to establish given the 
drastically different methods employed in literature.  As suggested by Snarr 
(2011), the reason for such large discrepancies in the literature is that there is no 
strong theoretical justification for any particular model or research design, the 
literature is largely empirical.  Therefore, all of the research is justifiable in its 
own right, insinuating that more effort has to be taken in establishing a stronger 
theoretical foundation or basis for the field so that a consensus may be reached.
 The principal difference between the empirical studies lies in their 
research methods, particularly how they decide to measure the decision to migrate 
between states, and how they decide to model such a decision.  For instance, 
Walker (1994) and Levine and Zimmerman (1999), like early empirical studies, 
examine population flows into states (inmigration) and out of states (outmigration) 
for different groups.  Meyer (2000) decides to compare differences in welfare 
participation rates between those who migrate to another state and those who do 
not.  McKinnish (2005, 2007) studies the differences in welfare expenditures at 
the county-level between border counties of adjacent states.  Blank (1988) adopts 
a less conventional and more time-consuming choice model of location which 
develops a more theoretical foundation than most research in the literature.  Unlike 
prior work, Frey et. al (1996) treats the decision to move as a sequential decision-
making process where individuals first decide if they are going to migrate and 
then where to migrate using a nested logit framework.  While some of these works 
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reach similar conclusions, the only other thing they have in common as that they 
all adopt drastically different fundamental approaches to the research question. 
This notion is consistent for the entire literature of welfare-induced migration.
 The second major difference between the studies in the literature that 
contributes to their differing conclusions is the choice of data employed by 
the researchers. As with the research methods, there is no strong theoretical 
foundation supporting any particular data set, especially considering that the 
choice of data is dependent on the methodology employed.  For example, Levine 
and Zimmerman (1999) and Kennan and Walker (2010) make use of data from 
the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) for examining young, female 
subpopulations.  Breuckner (2000) and Kaestner, Kaushal, and Van Ryzin (2003) 
use TANF-era data while Schram, Nitz, and Krueger (1998) and Gelbach (2004) 
utilize the Public Use Microdata Series derived from the U.S. Census.  Allard and 
Danziger (2000) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  Despite all of 
the different data sets, the U.S. Census is perhaps the most commonly used data 
source.  Enchautegui (1997) uses data from the 1980 U.S. Census, Meyer (2000) 
uses the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census data, and Frey et. al (1996) uses the 1990 U.S. 
Census data.  Again, the differences in Censuses used are largely dependent on 
the individual study and how they decided to examine welfare-induced migration. 
Ultimately, the differences in methodology and data combine to form two of the 
prominent factors leading to the general inconclusive nature of the literature. 
III. Research Methods and Modeling
 Given the preponderance of logit and probit models in the literature4, the 
econometric model developed in this study follows the probit framework.  The 
primary advantage of this model over other probabilistic models, specifically the 
4 Blank (1988); Frey et. al (1996); Enchautegui (1997); Levine and Zimmerman (1999); Davies, 
Greenwood, and Li (2001); Cushing (2003); Bailey (2005); Gelbach (2004).
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Linear Probability Model (LPM), is that the effect of explanatory variables (e.g. 
welfare benefit levels) can estimated to dynamically influence the likelihood of an 
event.  Additional benefits include imposing limits on the likelihood of an event 
(i.e. the probability of an event cannot be greater than 1 or less than 0).  
 The dependent variable measures whether or not the poor, single mother 
family moved from one state to another.  The explanatory variables in the model 
are the level of welfare benefits for a family of four offered in the current state of 
residence as well as the level offered in the previous state of residence.   These 
variables encapsulate the potential welfare effect.  The control variables are 
established by previous literature5.  I estimate the following probit model:
PR(MIGRATED) = Φ (B0 + B1HDAGE + B2HDEDUC+ B3HDEXPER 
+ B4NOKIDS + B5AGEYNG + B6BLACK + B7RACEOTHER + 
B8WELFLAST + B9MAXBEN + B10MAXBENLAST + B11UNEMP + 
B12UNEMPLAST+ B13DISTANCE)
where
AGEHD = Age of head of household 
HDEDUC = Education of head of household
HDEXPER = Experience of head of household
NOKIDS = Number of kids
AGEYNG = Age of youngest child
BLACK = 1 if head of household is black, 0 otherwise
RACEOTHER = 1 if head of household is non-white and non-black, 0 otherwise
WELFLAST = 1 if family was on welfare last year, 0 otherwise
MAXBEN = Maximum welfare benefits for a single-parent family of four in 
current state 
MAXBENLAST = Maximum welfare benefits for a single-parent family of four 
in previous state 
UNEMP = Unemployment rate in current state
UNEMPLAST=Unemployment rate in previous state
DISTANCE = Log of population-weighted greater area circle distance between 
previous state and contiguous state with highest welfare benefit offering
5 Rogers (1968); Todaro (1969); DaVanzo (1978); Tienda and Wilson(1992); Enchautegui (1997)
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 Using the previous literature, I generate expectations for the signs of dependent 
variables in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Briefly discussing the expected signs of the coefficient estimates, one would 
expect that being older, having more kids, and having older kids would all 
decrease the likelihood of migrating from a convenience standpoint.  Being black 
or another non-white and non-black race would also potentially decrease the 
likelihood of moving for these families as they generally have less income and, 
therefore, an inability to afford moving.  We would also expect greater education 
and experience for the head of household to decrease the likelihood of moving 
because they are aware of the negative impacts moving can have on a family, 
especially the children. Being the focus of the research question, we would expect 
that greater welfare benefits of the previous state would have a negative influence 
on the likelihood of moving (i.e. they wouldn’t need to move) and that greater 
welfare benefits in the current state would have positive influence on the likelihood 
of having moved (i.e. they moved to get the benefits).  The unemployment signs 
can be interpreted similarly.  
IV. Data
1. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1968 -2007
 The primary data set used in this econometric analysis will be the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 2007.  Developed by the 
Institute for Social Research (ISR) at the University of Michigan in 1968, the 
PSID is a longitudinal data set comprised of both individual and family level data 
Table 1 
Variable Sign 
HDAGE Negative 
HDEDUC Negative 
HDEXPER Negative 
NOKIDS Negative 
AGEYNG Negative 
BLACK Negative 
RACEOTHER Negative 
WELFLAST Negative 
MAXBEN 
MAXBENLAST 
UNEMP 
UNEMPLAST 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
DISTANCE Negative 
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collected for a variety of variables every year. While the previous discussion on 
the uncertainty of data selection in the literature suggested that any sufficient data 
set can be justified, the U.S. Census seemed to be the most universally accepted. 
The justification for the decision to use the PSID instead of the U.S. Census 
is twofold.  Firstly, PSID data was readily available and easy to manipulate to 
generate the necessary sample data.  Secondly, migration in the U.S. Census data 
is indicated by a person living in a different state than five years prior.  In effect, 
migration in each U.S. Census would only account for moves for every five years. 
In contrast, because the data comprising the PSID is collected every year, one is 
able to find yearly migration patterns.  This allows for a more dynamic analysis 
than the U.S. Census could provide.
 An additional fact to note, the PSID sample data used in the analysis was 
not the raw data but rather a subset of the data.  More precisely, the sample PSID 
data is comprised of only poor, single females who have been heads of household 
at some point in their life.  This was the best representative sample for examining 
the decision of poor, single mothers to move.  Assuming the decision to move is 
largely determined by the head of household, being a head of household would be 
a prerequisite for a mother to be able to make the decision to move.  While there 
are potential issues of specification bias involved with using a specific subset, for 
the sake of answering the research question, it is necessary.  Overall, the PSID 
data set accounts for all variables in the model except for unemployment rates, 
welfare benefits, and the distances between states.
 Most of the variables from this data set included in the econometric 
model were used in their raw form.  However, the dummy variables for black 
and raceother were derived using the variable for race, with white serving as the 
omitted condition.
48
2. Bob Moffitt Welfare Guarantee Variables
 The first supplemental data set was independently developed by 
established scholar Bob Moffitt and aggregates a variety of data from a wide 
array of sources.  With respect to this analysis, the data set contains information 
on unemployment rates of states and the maximum payment benefit for a single-
parent, family of four from 1968 to 1996.  As a note, the identification of welfare 
benefits in the model was at the state level instead of the county level, even 
though welfare benefits vary across counties for some states.  While county 
level information was available for individuals in the PSID, there was no clear 
procedure to assign the welfare benefits to the counties across time using the 
Moffitt dataset and the HHS dataset, described below.  As such, the welfare 
benefits levels used for states with varying welfare benefit levels across counties 
was that of the county with the greatest proportion of the total state population 
and, therefore, the most likely destination for a mover.
Available at www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/moffitt/ben_doc.pdf
3. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 The second supplemental data set was developed by the Urban Institute 
for the Welfare Rules Database.  The data set contains maximum payment benefits 
for a single-parent family of four data from 1996 to 2007.  
Available at http://anfdata.urban.org/WRD
4. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
 The third supplemental data set used consisted of the historical tables of 
average state unemployment rate for each state from 1996 to 2007.  
5. Greater Circle State Distances
 The final supplement data provides data on the log of the population-
weighted greater circle distance between any two states.  The population weights 
are used to determine population centers of states while the greater circle 
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measures incorporate the curvature of the earth in the calculation of distances 
between these population centers.  In the context of this analysis, the distance 
variable measures the distance between the state of residence in the previous year 
and a potential state, determined by finding the contiguous state with the greatest 
welfare benefits offerings.  This variable will serve as a proxy variable for the 
moving costs associated with interstate migration.
 Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, derived and described 
previously, were also generated as shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2
 Given prior knowledge, none of the variables seem particularly strange, 
although 99 years for the age of head, education and experience is relatively 
concerning. Further inspection of the data reveals that there are only a few 
observations with this problem, mostly from the earlier years of the dataset when 
there was likely more measurement error.
 
Table 2 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
HDAGE  31.20968  11.60559  0 99  
HDEDUC  6.905973  9.568182  0  99  
HDEXPER  
NOKIDS  
17.61352  
1.596788  
33.955  
1.523294  
0  
0  
99  
11  
AGEYNG  3.516814  4.255007  0  17  
BLACK  0.752964  0.4313111  0  1  
RACEOTHER  0.0472085  0.2120959  0  1  
WELFLAST  0.3798314  0.4853713  0  1  
MAXBEN  
MAXBENLAST  
385.2062  
380.7177  
179.7597  
177.7997  
60  
55.02  
1064  
1064  
UNEMP  
UNEMPLAST 
DISTANCE  
6.542549  
6.541871 
4.583395  
2.066404  
2.105017 
3.234206  
2.1  
2.1 
0.384506  
15.5 
15.5 
11.2152  
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V. Empirical Results
 Estimating the econometric model, I obtained the regression output 
shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3
 Before interpreting the regression output for the probit regression, it was 
important to run an alternative regression model (LPM) to allow for the testing of 
common regression issues. Issues of heteroskedasticity were present in the model, 
namely in the hdage, hdeduc, and hdexper variables, as evidenced by the Breusch-
Pagan Test and White’s Test for heteroskedasticity and accompanying graphical 
analyses.  In response, one could employ robust standard errors.  Additionally, 
problems of multicollinearity where found, using variable inflation factors, 
particularly between unemp and unemplast, and maxbenlast and maxben.  This 
is unsurprising since these variables are strongly collinear (only approximately 5 
 
Table 3 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Score  P-value  Marginal Effects 
HDAGE  -0.038255  -5.47  0.000*  -0.0016894  
HDEDUC  -0.0013423  -0.31  0.759  -0.0000593  
HDEXPER  
NOKIDS  
0.0047558  
-0.0741016  
1.81  
-1.69  
0.070**  
0.091**  
0.00021 
-0.0032724  
AGEYNG  -0.0229523  -1.52  0.129  -0.0010136  
BLACK  -0.131427  01.06  0.291  -0.006228  
RACEOTHER  -0.0319729  -0.15  0.882  -0.0013707  
WELFLAST  -0.5434885  -4.35  0.000*  -0.024173  
MAXBEN  
MAXBENLAST  
0.0012908  
-0.0013529  
2.36  
-2.42  
0.018*  
0.015*  
0.000057 
-0.0000597  
UNEMP  
UNEMPLAST 
DISTANCE  
-0.2134598  
0.1289763 
0.019423  
-3.26  
2.05 
1.25  
0.001*  
0.040* 
0.212  
-0.0094266 
0.0056957 
0.008577  
N = 3001  Prob > chi2(13) 
= 0.0000  
Psuedo R2 = 
0.1567  
Log likelihood =    
-375.42839  
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percent of the total observations actually migrate to another state).  Since dropping 
or transforming these key variables would negate the analysis hitherto, nothing 
will be done, although one should remain mindful of the negative consequences 
of multicollinearity.  Lastly, we find evidence of model misspecification using the 
Ramsey RESET test.  The most obvious functional form issue lies in the omission 
of a squared term for distance whose addition may improve the model as the 
effect of distance on the likelihood of moving may increase at a decreasing rate. 
For further information on these tests, refer to the Appendix.
 Enacting the remedies for these regression issues, most notably the 
addition of a distance-squared term, I generated the regression output depicted in 
Table 4 below.
Table 4
All of the coefficient estimates with a single asterisk were found to be statistically significant at the 
0.05 significance level while those with a double asterisk were found to be statistically significant at 
the 0.10 significance level.
 
Table 4 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Score  P-value  Marginal Effects 
HDAGE  -0.0391325 -5.52 0.000*  -0.0016446 
HDEDUC  -0.0019966 -0.45  0.656  -0.0000839 
HDEXPER  
NOKIDS  
0.0051451 
-0.0814076 
1.95 
-1.82  
0.051**  
0.068**  
0.0002162 
-0.0034214  
AGEYNG  -0.0225078  -1.46  0.143  -0.000946 
BLACK  -0.0696176  -0.55 0.582  -0.0030258 
RACEOTHER  0.0122366 0.06  0.955  -0.0005202 
WELFLAST  -0.5492922 -4.36  0.000*  -0.0232821 
MAXBEN  
MAXBENLAST  
0.0012441  
-0.0010184 
2.28 
-1.79  
0.023*  
0.074** 
0.0000523 
-0.0000428 
UNEMP  
UNEMPLAST 
DISTANCE  
DISTANCESQ 
-0.220425  
0.1242484 
0.2361678 
-0.017081 
-3.36  
1.97 
3.07 
-2.89 
0.001*  
0.049* 
0.002* 
0.004*  
-0.009264 
0.0052219 
0.0099256 
-0.0007179 
N = 3001  Prob > chi2(13) 
= 0.0000  
Psuedo R2 = 
0.1666  
Log likelihood =    
-371.02267   
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 All of the signs of the coefficient estimates on the variables were found to 
be in accord with prior expectations except for the sign of the coefficient estimate 
on hdexper, which was presumed to have the same sign as hdeduc (i.e. positive). 
The exact cause of this discrepancy is difficult to discern, but hdeduc and hdexper 
moving in opposite directions does not seem entirely intuitive.  Overall, all of 
the coefficient estimates were found to be statistically significant at the 0.10 
significance level except for those on the education of the head of household, 
the race dummies, and the age of the youngest child.   However, these coefficient 
estimates being statistically insignificant does not necessarily impact the research 
question in any substantial manner.  
 Interestingly, we find that coefficient estimate on maxben is significant 
at the 0.05 significance level while the coefficient estimate on maxbenlast is 
significant at the 0.10 significance level.  This suggests that, given the sign of these 
coefficients, as the benefit level of the previous state decreases, the probability of 
moving increases and that as the benefit level of the current state increases, the 
probability of having moved increases.  Taken in conjunction, these results suggest 
that the population of poor, single mothers move from states with low welfare 
benefits to states that offer high welfare benefits.  In effect, this is evidence that the 
phenomenon of welfare incentives may exist for poor, single mothers, incentivizing 
them to move to other states in order to receive higher benefits.
 Further analysis of the magnitude of the marginal effects of the 
coefficient estimates is necessary to determine whether the welfare effect is 
economically significant. In order to accomplish this analysis, I use the marginal 
effects generated by the regression analysis to estimate the effect of certain benefit 
levels on the likelihood of moving to another state for poor, single mothers. 
More precisely, I develop a general range of effects for both benefit variables, 
ranging from two standard deviations below the respective mean benefit level to 
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two standard deviations above said mean. With respect to the Maxben variable, I 
calculate a predicted increase in the likelihood of moving for poor, single mothers 
ranging from 0.134 percent to 3.895 percent at benefit levels of 25.69 dollars and 
744.73 dollars, respectively. Similarly, with respect to the Maxbenlast variable, I 
calculate a predicted decrease in the likelihood of moving for poor, single mothers 
ranging from 0.108 percent to 3.151 percent at benefit levels of 25.12 dollars and 
736.32 dollars, respectively.  Thus, the role of welfare benefits in the migration 
decisions of poor, single mothers ranges from fairly inconsequential to somewhat 
substantial.  Still, even at their most substantial, the influence on the decision to 
move is relatively minimal.  Overall, these results largely agree with the majority 
of the prior literature on welfare incentives which found a statistical significant 
but economically modest role for welfare incentives.
  Additionally worth discussing, adding the distancesq term to the 
regression analysis made both the coefficient estimate on it and distance 
statistically significant at even the 0.01 significance level.  Clearly, being as 
the purpose of these variables was to control for the cost of moving, one would 
imagine that they would play a significant role, even if they were not the best 
proxy for moving costs.  Taken in conjunction, these variables suggest that as 
the distance between the current state and a potential state with greater benefits 
increases, the probability of moving increases but at a decreasing rate.  This does 
not make theoretical sense as, presumably, greater distances would decrease the 
likelihood of moving because of greater moving costs. A better proxy for moving 
costs, given the likely measurement error in this variable, may alleviate this 
inconsistency.
 Furthermore, we find that the coefficient estimates on the unemployment 
variables were statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.  This evidence 
suggests that employment opportunities play an important role in the decision to 
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role for poor, single mothers.  Given their difficult situation, greater employment 
opportunities, as measured by the unemployment rate of states, would reasonably 
provide incentives for moving.  Even so, the marginal effects of these coefficient 
estimates are relatively small when considering that a one percentage increase 
in the unemployment rate of the previous state would increase the likelihood of 
moving by less than 1 percent, as predicted by the model.
 Given the diagnostic tests run, there is some concern that these results may 
not be valid but, beyond basic amendments, any significant changes to the model 
may itself invalidate the ability of the model to address the research question. 
While issues of heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity are concerning, however, 
they would not necessary nullify any of the conclusions of the model, but they do 
suggest that the probit framework may not be the ideal model for answering the 
research question, at least in the incarnation used in this analysis.  Recently, the 
literature on welfare incentives in migration decisions has begun to adapt optimal 
choice models wherein an individual must consider multiple locations across the 
country before deciding where to move.  Comparatively, the model used in this 
analysis was relatively simplistic, which may not be ideal given that the decision 
to move can be very complex.  Furthermore, these issues may arise as a result of 
poor identification of explanatory variables, although the problem does not seem 
as severe as it was prior to several amendments. 
VI. Conclusions
 In order to investigate how the migration decisions of poor, single 
mothers migrate were influenced by the welfare benefits offered by states, I chose 
to estimate a basic econometric probit model.  Using prior research to determine 
relevant control variables and data from a variety of sources, I tested my model 
and found evidence for a modest influence of welfare incentives on the decision 
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to move for poor, single mothers.  Most of variables included in the model were 
found to be statistically significant with appropriate signs at the designated 
significance level, suggesting that poor, single mothers do move from states with 
low welfare benefits to those with high welfare benefits.  
 These results are generally in accord with the majority of the literature on 
welfare incentives and interstate migration, which finds modest roles for welfare 
incentives in the decision to move.  The policy implications of this study, and those 
that found similar conclusions, are vast.  Specifically, the foundation of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ between states is largely unfounded if welfare incentives do substantially 
influence decisions to move.  As such, the only effect of competing to offer lower 
benefits may be to simply worsen the standard of living for poor populations rather 
than export those populations.  Ultimately, while state legislators should consider 
welfare incentives when changing welfare policy, it should not be a primary 
consideration.  Further research into the ‘race to the bottom’ phenomenon, how 
much state legislators consider welfare incentives when crafting policy, and the 
potential impacts of the latter on the poverty population are all advents for further 
research.  Within the scope of the literature, further consideration should be given 
towards developing a more theoretical foundation so that a greater consensus in 
the literature can be obtained, at the very least establishing theoretical preference 
to certain datasets or methodologies.  Otherwise, it will remain impractical 
to compare the conclusions of these widely differing analyses.  In addition to 
further consideration to these topics, the econometric model may be improved by 
utilizing an optimal choice framework, better indentifying explanatory variables, 
and obtaining better measurements for certain variables such as moving costs. 
If done, one may be able to obtain even better evidence for the moderate role of 
welfare incentives in the decision to move, especially as relates to poor, single 
mothers.
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Appendix
Tests for Heteroskedascity 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of chgstate 
         chi2(1)      =   200.41 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity 
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
         chi2(100)    =   1814.64 
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0000 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |    1814.64    100    0.0000 
            Skewness |     452.91     13    0.0000 
            Kurtosis |      84.66      1    0.0000 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |    2352.22    114    0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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Graphical Analyses for Heteroskedasticity of Relevant Variables
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Test for Multicollinearity
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF  
-------------+----------------------
   UNEMPLAST |     27.66    0.036159
       UNEMP |     27.62    0.036208
  MAXBENLAST |     23.18    0.043146
      MAXBEN |     23.15    0.043195
       BLACK |      1.47    0.682390
    WELFLAST |      1.28    0.778561
   RACEOTHER |      1.28    0.782762
      NOKIDS |      1.27    0.785496
       AGEHD |      1.17    0.853040
    DISTANCE |      1.15    0.865918
     HDEXPER |      1.14    0.876884
      AGEYNG |      1.09    0.915698
      HDEDUC |      1.04    0.963181
-------------+----------------------
    Mean VIF |      8.65
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